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The Voice of the People: Public Participation in the African Continent
by Rafael Macia Briedis*
ABSTRACT
Public participation is becoming a more common characteristic of
constitutional drafting processes around the world, and Africa has not been an
exception in this regard. This paper seeks to survey several of the public
participation processes undertaken in a number of African nations, in order to
examine the methods followed and the effects produced by such processes. For
that purpose, I have analyzed the constitutional drafting efforts in South Africa,
Uganda, Eritrea, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Kenya, and Egypt. These processes all
show different circumstances and approaches, with variations in terms of their
top-down or bottom-up nature, and, more importantly, in terms of the
genuineness behind the attempt to educate and consult the public.

Introduction
There has been a growing trend, especially in recent years, to consider public participation an
essential aspect of constitutional enactment. Indeed, involvement of the citizenry in the creation
of a constitution is often seen as a legitimizing component of the drafting process, and as
fostering public understanding of and support for the process itself. This understanding and
support is in turn thought to be transmitted to the ensuing product (the constitution).1 Not
everyone agrees with this assessment, though. Some scholars argue that public participation in
the design of a constitution may lead to social instability by generating a fight over resources
and by bringing forth latent conflictive ethnic identities. Additionally, they contend that public
participation will lead to constitutions based on personal, rather than communal, interests, and
that it will generate incoherent documents due to lack of agreement. Finally, they argue that
public participation does not guarantee that citizens will feel sufficiently incentivized to
meaningfully participate.2
The purpose of the present paper is not to resolve the dispute between supporters and detractors
of public participation, but rather to provide a comparative review of public participation in
different constitutional drafting processes undertaken in the African continent, so that readers
may reach their own conclusions. This work was originally intended as a background research
*

JD/PhD Candidate at Indiana University Maurer School of Law, and Managing Affiliate at the Center for
Constitutional Democracy.
1
See Zachary Elkins et al., The Citizen as Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional Approval, 81 TEMP.
L. REV. 361, 362–63, 370 (2008).
2
See, e.g., id. at 374 (summarizing some of the skeptical views regarding public participation).
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for a larger project. Thus, a number of disclaimers are due. First, as a support document, the
paper is not a research work properly speaking. The information contained within it has been
obtained almost exclusively from secondary sources, with limited variety, and without relying,
for the most part, on primary investigation.3 Therefore, it is more appropriate to consider this
paper a compendium of synthesized, descriptive information found in other, more specific
works, compiled with the intention of making that information more accessible to those
interested in African public participation. Second, this paper is not meant to comprise an
exhaustive list of all possible public participation processes undertaken in Africa. There may
be other constitutional drafting processes that are not covered here and that may nevertheless
still be of interest to the reader. However, I believe that the ones actually included in the present
work are the most relevant in terms of their significance and of the variety of perspectives they
provide. Furthermore, an effort has been made to analyze states from across the African
geographical spectrum, from Egypt in the north to South Africa in the south, although the bulk
of the analysis is on sub-Saharan nations.
The method followed in the paper is a country by country description of the public participation
processes, along with particular conclusions for each country that put their processes in
perspective with the rest. These brief analyses will hopefully provide some comparative insight
into the problems and benefits of the different processes surveyed. They should also serve to
emphasize the fact that specific national circumstances require a contextual approach to public
participation. In line with these goals, I have also included in the final part of the paper a series
of conclusions addressing the most relevant considerations that can be extracted from the
comparative analysis of the cases. Perhaps the most obvious conclusion is that a distinction can
be made between top-down and bottom-up participation processes. The top-down approach
presents an already-produced draft to the people and attempts to educate (or convince) them
about such draft, while perhaps also obtaining their views on some incidental aspects of the
document. The bottom-up approach seeks out and includes (to varying degrees) the views of
the citizens from the very beginning of the drafting process, in an attempt to make the whole
constitution be influenced by those ideas that a majority of the population may share. The
country studies below, however, show that there may be circumstances that particularly warrant
the choice of either one of these options over the other. In the end, the legitimacy of the process
depends more on the good or bad faith intentions behind the educational and consultative
programs than on the initiative (elite-driven or popular) in drafting the original document.

Country Studies

3

In this endeavor, I am especially indebted to the book edited by Laurel E. Miller, FRAMING THE STATE IN
TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, from which I drew a good amount of
information, both on the specifics of several public participation processes, and on the actual countries where
such a process took place. Even though this book has been used as one of the main sources for the present paper,
I have made an effort to draw from different materials, and to contrast all the information with other sources to
ensure objectivity. FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING
(Laurel E. Miller eds., 2010).
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A. South Africa (1997 Constitution)

1. Background
It may be adequate to start off by stating that, regardless of the uniqueness of each of the
analyzed countries' public participation processes, South Africa's can be said with little doubt
to be the best example of them all in terms of its effectiveness, thoroughness, and final result.
Even though not exempt from problems, it was overall a bottom-up process that genuinely
sought the people’s views, and in which an active effort was made to include the participation
of those who would have otherwise been left out. The process exhibited an important display
of manpower and resources, and the final product to a certain extent reflected the views
expressed by the citizens.
On May 9, 1994, the National Assembly and the Senate sat jointly to form the Constitutional
Assembly, tasked with drafting a permanent constitution for the country.4 This was only two
weeks after the completion of the nation's first democratic elections that marked the end of the
Apartheid rule.5 The Interim Constitution, which paved the way for drafting the permanent one,
had imposed a time frame of two years for the conclusion of that task, and had laid out thirtyfour principles that the permanent constitution had to comply with.6
In setting forth the specific guidelines for public participation in the drafting of the new
constitution, the Constitutional Assembly specified three distinct categories of participants to
be taken into account: political formations, civil society organizations (understood to represent
the most efficient way of taking minority interests into account), and the broader public.7 In
order to ensure the participation of these groups, two departments of the Constitutional
Assembly were set up. The first was the Community Liaison Department, which focused on
the conceptualization and development of the Public Participation Program.8 The other was the
Media Department, tasked with developing and implementing the media campaign to inform,
educate, and stimulate public interest;9 this was achieved through conventional media means
(television, radio, and print), along with other methods such as the internet, brochures,
bulletins, cassettes, videos, posters, and a constitutional newsletter.10
Additionally, the Constitutional Committee was also formed.11 This coordinative body dealt
with content-related issues and reported directly to the Constitutional Assembly. Its mandate
was to negotiate the content of the new constitution, and to discuss the reports issued by six
4

SYNNØVE SKJELTEN, A PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTION: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS 13 (Inst. Global Dialogue ed., 2006).
5
Id.
6
Id.; Christina Murray, A Constitutional Beginning: Making South Africa's Final Constitution, 23 UNIV. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2001).
7
SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 40.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id. at 44–45; Murray, supra note 6, at 816–17.
11
SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 49.
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subordinate Theme Committees.12 The Constitutional Committee also included a subcommittee intended to facilitate negotiations among the political parties, as well as a
management committee to deal with managerial tasks.13

2. Public Participation about Public Participation
An interesting aspect of the South African public participation program is that it included a
procedure for the public to submit its views on how the public participation program itself
should be conducted.14 This is for the most part only a curiosity though, for the possibility to
make submissions in this regard was limited to a five-day period, and was simply announced
through a publication by the Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly in a newspaper.15 The
result was that citizens submitted few (though admittedly relevant) proposals. On the other
hand, however, there was a direct interaction between the Community Liaison Department and
various civil society organizations, for the purpose of determining the commitment of the latter
to the Public Participation Process.16

3. The Public Participation Process
The official Public Participation Process was divided in two phases. The first was a pre-draft
phase, lasting eleven months, in which the public was invited to make general submissions on
the potential content of the constitution.17 These submissions were forwarded to the respective
Theme Committees, which would take them into consideration when submitting their report to
the Constitutional Committee.18 In the end, the Committees received 13,433 substantive
submissions, with signed petitions amounting to over two million.19 It was also during this first
phase that the Constitutional Public Meetings (of which there will be more to say below) took
place.20 The second phase, lasting five months, involved the creation of a working-draft.21
During this period, the public and civil society organizations were invited to comment on the
draft.22

12

See id. These Committees were tasked with receiving submissions from the public in accordance to their
specific themes, which were the following: character of the democratic state; structure of the government;
relationship among levels of government; bill of rights and human dignity; the judiciary and the legal system;
and specialized structures of the government. Id. at 50–52.
13
Id. at 49.
14
Id. at 41–42.
15
See id.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 45.
18
Id.
19
PHILIPP DANN ET AL., LESSONS LEARNED FROM CONSTITUTION-MAKING: PROCESSES WITH BROAD BASED
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION 6 (Democracy Reporting Int'l ed., 2011); Murray, supra note 6, at 817.
20
SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 45.
21
Id.
22
Id; DANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
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There were three fora of focus during the Public Participation Program: "Affected Interests"
(dealing with civil society and sector representatives), "General Public," and the "Area fora"
(later called "Constitutional Public Meetings").23

a. The Constitutional Education Program
The Constitutional Education Program was specifically intended for the general education of
the public on constitutional issues, and for the provision of information about the constitutional
process in all of South Africa's official languages.24 For this purpose, provincial information
offices were established throughout the country. Additionally, the Program included
workshops oriented towards educating the public about constitutionalism, human rights, and
the drafting process, so as to enable rural, marginalized, and disadvantaged persons to have a
say. These workshops (totaling over 1000)25 were especially relevant given the high rate of
illiteracy among the population. Furthermore, the workshops were of a participatory nature;
therefore, while their principal focus was on education, they also included some public
participation features in the style of the Constitutional Public Meetings.26 Once the process
moved into the "working-draft phase," however, the workshops focused exclusively on
educating the public about the draft, and thus were more explanatory than participatory.27
Another important educational measure was the radio, with broadcasts in eight different
languages and an estimated weekly reach of ten million people.28
Overall, more than 95,000 people, mostly located in rural and disadvantaged areas, directly
interacted with the provincial coordinators through workshops and meetings.29 Furthermore, a
nationwide survey indicated that the media education campaign reached seventy-three percent
of adult South Africans, who acquired a fairly high level of knowledge about the constitution.30

b. The Constitutional Public Meetings
The Constitutional Public Meetings (CPMs), to which brief reference has been made already,
were an essential part of the Public Participation Process, and to a certain extent constituted its
backbone. For these meetings, the members of the Constitutional Assembly themselves
travelled to meet citizens directly in their communities and receive their input.31 In order for a
location to be eligible for holding a CPM, it had to be rural, marginalized, and disadvantaged.32
23

SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 42.
See DANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
25
Id.
26
See SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 44, 76, 86.
27
See id. at 86–87.
28
DANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
29
See SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 87.
30
DANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 6; Murray, supra note 6, at 817.
31
SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 56.
32
Id. at 57.
24
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There was an important degree of organization behind these meetings, so that they were not
merely spontaneous "field trips" intended to improve the image of the Constitutional
Assembly. Prior to the meetings, two "advance teams" would be established; these were
responsible for setting up steering committees, designing contingency plans, and ensuring that
everything was ready for the meeting.33
Similar care was taken in the treatment of individual submissions presented during the CPMs.
All submissions were recorded, transcribed, and sent to the relevant Theme Committee after
being indexed in a computer database.34 Afterwards, the submissions that each Theme
Committee dealt with were categorized into subjects and put in volumes that were in turn
handed over to the parliamentarians.35 People could even trace by phone the status of their
individual submissions throughout the whole process, checking, for example, what Theme
Committee was discussing them, and on what date.36
A total of twenty-seven CPMs were held, some of them in extremely remote areas. The total
number of participants approximated 20,500, and included 717 different organizations and 200
members of the Constitutional Assembly.37 In general, the CPMs received an overwhelming
response from the people, with each meeting becoming a huge event in the community.38 While
some concerns persisted, notably the disproportionate male participation, the Constitutional
Assembly argued that the meetings achieved a great success and that they had a substantial
impact on the final product.39

c. Other Aspects of the Public Participation Process
A number of additional measures were undertaken to enhance the effectiveness of the Public
Participation Process.
First, the Constitutional Education Program used plain language, rather than a very technical
or excessively legalistic one. And, perhaps more importantly, this language was mirrored in
the final constitutional draft itself, for the purpose of ensuring easier access on the part of the
public.40
Second, even during the final stages of the constitutional negotiation, once both the pre-draft
and the working-draft phases were over, the door was left open for individuals to submit
additional comments to the Constitutional Committee.41
33

Id. at 58 (pointing out the emphasis placed on prior consultation with the community leaders, and on
generating a sense of co-ownership of the CPM in the attendants).
34
Id. at 64; see also DANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
35
SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 64; see also DANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
36
SKJELTEN, supra note 4, at 64.
37
Id. at 70.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 71–72.
40
Id. at 93–97.
41
Id. at 139.
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Last, once the Constitution was adopted by the Constitutional Assembly and sent to the
Constitutional Court for certification (in accordance with the requirements set forth by the
interim constitution), civil society organizations, political parties, and individuals were still
afforded the opportunity to make submissions to the court, with a total of eighty-four such
submissions being sent.42

4. Conclusion
South Africa's public participation process is in most regards the paradigm of popular
involvement in the drafting of a new constitution, at least within the African continent, but
most likely also in a global context. From the very beginning, the process was a bottom-up one,
in the sense that the people were consulted about their thoughts and concerns regarding what
the constitutional draft should include in the first place. They were not merely presented with
an already drafted document, to be educated about it, but rather were active participants
throughout the whole drafting process. There was even a possibility (albeit a constrained one)
of providing input on how the public participation process itself should run. This goes a long
way in showing the desire to involve the public in every aspect of the process.
It can be said almost with complete certainty that the public participation process was based on
a good faith effort, first, to determine the views of the people in order to adapt (with the
inevitable limits) the future constitution to those views; second, to educate the public in regards
to constitutionalism; and third, to provide the citizens with a sense of ownership over the final
document, rather than with a sense of imposition.43 The process does not appear to have been
an attempt to simply provide facial legitimacy to an already pre-determined draft.
Finally, public participation was carried out in an effective and organized manner so as to reach
the greatest number of people possible, and especially those whose voices would have
otherwise been less likely to be heard.

B. Uganda (1995 Constitution)

1. Background
The drafting process that led to Uganda's 1995 Constitution presents a rather contradictory
scenario. On the one hand, the process included an extremely widespread public participation
program, notable among other things for its unprecedented inclusion of women. On the other,
the process was riddled by very important undemocratic characteristics, reflected in the
prohibition of party participation that arose out of the ruling National Resistance Movement's
(NRM) pretension of representing the interests of all Ugandans. This prohibition became
especially relevant given that one of the main issues at stake was the adoption or rejection in
42
43

Id. at 139–140
DANN ET AL., supra note 19, at 6; Murray, supra note 6, at 816, 822.
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the constitution of a multiparty system (the latter option being the one favored by the NRM).
And in this regard the problems started from the very beginning, with the appointment of the
twenty-one members to the Constitutional Commission44 (the body in charge of the
constitutional drafting process): practically all of those members were supporters of the
NRM.45

2. Public Participation
Regardless of the undemocratic issues, however, the level of public participation during the
drafting process was almost unprecedented. It has even been stated that "[i]n Uganda a higher
percentage of individuals participated in a larger variety of activities over a longer period of
time than in any other participatory constitution-making process worldwide."46 Overall, more
than 25,000 individual submissions were sent to the Commission throughout the process.47
Furthermore, as mentioned above, there was widespread involvement of women; this included
not only individual women, but also women’s groups.48 The engagement with the female part
of the population was exemplary not just in the context of Africa, but also at a worldwide
level.49
The Constitutional Commission held seminars and gathered opinions from leaders and
organization representatives throughout the whole country. These seminars and meetings were
attended by massive numbers of people, who also participated in the debate. In total, seminars
regarding the constitution were allegedly attended by around 30,000 community leaders.50
Other seminars were also held at the sub-county level, in which the commissioners explained
the constitution-making process. They later returned to each of the 870 sub-counties in order
to consult the people through the collection of oral statements and written memoranda, over
25,000 of the latter being analyzed.51 Other means of involving the public included a student
essay contest and continuous discussions in the media.52 Overall, the public participation and
constitution drafting process took over five years, the Constitutional Commission being
established in 1998, two years after the NRM's ascension to power in 1996.53
44

Devra C. Moehler, Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda, 44 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 275,
281 (2006).
45
See Aili Mari Tripp, The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF
TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra note 3, at 158, 162–63; Moehler, supra note 44,
at 282.
46
Moehler, supra note 44, at 282.
47
Tripp, supra note 45, at 163.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Moehler, supra note 44, at 281; see also MICHELLE BRANDT ET AL., CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND REFORM,
OPTIONS FOR THE PROCESS 348 (Interpeace ed., 2011).
52
Moehler, supra note 44, at 281.
53
BRANDT ET AL., supra note 51, at 348; Moehler, supra note 44, at 281.
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Nevertheless, there has been skepticism as to whether the people's expressed concerns found
an actual expression in the text of the constitutional draft.54 This is in large part due to the fact
that the Constitutional Commission's tour focused more on education about the constitution
than on consultation.55 It has further been claimed that the public participation process was
used as a tool to gain support for the NRM's one-party (or no-party) proposal,56 especially
because while the advantages and disadvantages of the different possible systems were listed
in the guiding questions that set the framework for the public debates, only the one-party
advantages were actually presented during those debates.57
An additional issue was the controlled nature of civic education regarding the constitutional
drafting. In this regard, several difficulties and constraints were imposed on NGOs that
intended to take part in the process, difficulties that greatly restricted the participation of civil
society.58
Last, public participation was negatively affected by the ban on candidates running for the
Constitutional Assembly (in charge of reviewing and enacting the proposed constitution)59 to
use any kind of party affiliation, or to participate in campaign rallies or support activities other
than those organized by the government.60 Candidates had thus to run as individuals, and not
under a party's banner.61 This restriction suppressed public debate over the draft's most
controversial aspects, like the multiparty or one-party choice, since parties favoring an
approach that differed from the NRM's were not able to openly support their candidates through
the use of the media or other means to assert their views.62 Therefore, some political viewpoints
were effectively excluded from the public discussion. Ironically (although perhaps
foreseeably), the NRM did in fact act as a political party (for all practical purposes) during the
elections to the Constitutional Assembly, supporting its own candidates and presenting its own
views favorably in the eyes of the public, while not allowing other parties to do the same.63
The NRM's justification for this was once again its purported non-party nature and its claim to
represent all Ugandans. One consequence was that part of the electoral process was driven
underground, with clandestine campaign events being held at funerals, churches, and other
venues, which in turn produced a shift in the nature of the public debate.64

3. Conclusion
54

Tripp, supra note 45, at 163.
See id.
56
See id.
57
Id.; Moehler, supra note 44, at 282.
58
Tripp, supra note 45, at 163–64.
59
Id. at 165.
60
Moehler, supra note 44, at 282.
61
Tripp, supra note 45, at 165–66; Moehler, supra note 44, at 282 (pointing out claims of unfairness in the
Assembly elections).
62
Tripp, supra note 45, at 165–66.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 166.
55
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The case of Uganda may be the prime example of how a widespread and widely attended public
participation program for the drafting of a constitution can be negatively affected by the
inclusion of a few, though extremely relevant, undemocratic measures. What would otherwise
have been a commendable initiative was greatly misused through its transformation into a tool
to produce support for one particular viewpoint (regardless of the possible good intentions of
the participants), rather than into a means to determine the genuine will of the people. In this
regard, the Ugandan public participation process can to some extent be considered a
propaganda mechanism for the NRM and its no-party scheme. The process was (as opposed to
South Africa's) ultimately top-down, in which public participation was used to "educate" (at
times genuinely, and at times propagandistically) and to convince the people about a desired
result, rather than to consult and to adapt the final product to the views of the public. There
was also a good deal of genuine education and consultation, however, with an important
outreach through a very extensive period of time. This, in the end, may have had at least some
positive effects in the population by allowing it to get to some extent involved in the drafting
process, and a feeling of public ownership over the constitution has indeed prevailed among a
good number Ugandans.65

C. Eritrea (1997 Constitution)

1. Background
After Eritrea's independence from Ethiopia in 1993, the country set out to draft a constitution
that would serve as the foundation for the government of the state, with a democratic order in
mind.66 The constitution-drafting process included a program for public participation in which
education of the population on constitutional issues became a primary goal. The constitutional
process was a successful one, at least in the sense that it generated a final product that was
ratified by the Constitutional Assembly in May 1997.67 Nevertheless, the ratified constitution
was never implemented by the government, and has therefore never found application in
practice. The nature of the public participation process, however, makes its study interesting
for the purposes of the present paper.
The drafting process was led by a Constitutional Commission established by the government.68
This Commission consisted of fifty government-appointed members, including representatives
of all nine Eritrean ethnic groups, members of different religions (Christian, Muslim, and
Animist), twenty-one women, and a ten-member Executive Committee.69 The Commission
65

Moehler, supra note 44, at 282.
See Richard A. Rosen, Constitutional Process, Constitutionalism, and the Eritrean Experience, 24 N.C. J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 263, 279, 284 (1998).
67
See id. at 293.
68
See id. at 284.
69
See id. at 285-286, 304; see also Bereket Habte Selassie, Constitution Making in Eritrea: A Process-Driven
Approach, in FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, supra
note 3, at 57, 62–63.
66
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divided the process into four separate steps. First came the logistical phase, which focused on
organizing the Commission, raising funds, educating the public, and starting the initial drafting
work.70 The second phase placed the emphasis on public education regarding the Commission's
role and regarding basic constitutional concepts, along with the preparation of a full draft taking
public opinion into account where appropriate.71 The third phase included a broad public debate
on the Commission's draft, and the submission of the draft to the National Assembly.72 Last,
the fourth phase was intended as a furtherance of the public debate to be followed by the
submission of the final draft to the Constitutional Assembly for ratification.73
The Constitutional Commission's task placed a great emphasis on direct involvement in the
process from people outside the government.74 For that purpose, it counted on the help of a
Standing Committee on Civic Education and Public Debate, which acted under the guidance
of the Executive Committee.75

2. The Civic Education Campaign
The low level of education across the nation76 made education of the public an imperative issue
during the drafting process. With that task in mind, members of the Constitutional Commission,
along with more than 400 instructors, were deployed to conduct public seminars in village and
town meetings.77 Additionally, seven provincial offices and seventy-three local committees
were established for the purpose of assisting with public education.78 An important initiative,
given the low literacy rates among the population, was the widespread use of non-printed
means of education. These included, among other things, songs, poetry, short stories, a comic
book, mobile theater groups, concerts, and radio programs dealing with constitutional themes.79
Moreover, special efforts were made to involve students in the process, especially by means of
the radio.80 In the end, the education campaign reached more than 500,000 people,81 and it has
been stated that "the Commission introduced people who had never even heard the word
'constitution' to the notion of the primacy of the Constitution, and to the need to respect the
rights of those protected by it."82
3. Public Participation
70

Selassie, supra note 69, at 62–63.
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
See Rosen, supra note 66, at 285.
75
See Selassie, supra note 69, at 67; Rosen, supra note 66, at 286 n.112.
76
See Rosen, supra note 66, at 279.
77
See Selassie, supra note 69, at 67.
78
Id.
79
See JOANNE WALLIS, CONSTITUTION MAKING DURING STATE BUILDING 49 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed.,
2014); Rosen, supra note 66, at 296.
80
Rosen, supra note 66, at 296.
81
See Selassie, supra note 69, at 68; WALLIS, supra note 79, at 49.
82
See Rosen, supra note 66, at 294.
71
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As to public participation properly speaking, it started with the release by the Constitutional
Commission of proposals to be submitted to the public for debate (although this was preceded
by the translation and dissemination of a number of international documents and compacts for
public discussion, during phase one of the process).83 These proposals were divided in two
parts: the first part dealt with the principles of the basic constitutional framework, with a special
focus on the importance of democracy, diversity, and national unity; the second part proposed
specifics of the constitutional order, such as a unicameral legislature, the rejection of
federalism, and a five-year presidential term.84 Several fundamental rights were included in the
initial proposals as well, namely life, privacy, freedom of belief, freedom of expression, and
freedom of organization, along with female equality provisions.85
Following the release, the members of the Executive Committee launched a series of regional
debates about the proposals for a period of four months.86 During these debates, the subjects to
be discussed were selected and introduced by the Executive Committee members themselves,
and the debate sessions included an exchange of questions and answers with the public.87 The
recording of the debates and the documentation of all the questions and points raised was
overseen by the Standing Committee, which also submitted summary reports for consideration
by the Executive Committee during the drafting process.88 The questions were further analyzed
statistically, based on several variables (like gender or region), as a means to support the
Commission's duty to produce a draft reflecting public opinion to the greatest possible extent.89
These Executive-Committee-sponsored meetings were held in 157 different locations and
involved the participation of over 110,000 Eritreans, with the addition of another 11,000
abroad.90
Once the members of the Constitutional Commission agreed upon a first draft, after having
collected and analyzed the information and opinions raised in the public debates, they
forwarded it to the National Assembly.91 This body approved it with a small number of
amendments, and the revised draft was submitted for a new round of public debate (in which
approximately 400,000 Eritreans participated),92 being lastly finalized and ratified with minor
changes by the Constitutional Assembly.93 As mentioned above, however, the new constitution
never found implementation following its ratification due to the government’s final reluctance,
and so the whole process of its drafting became to some extent moot.
83

See id. at 295.
See Selassie, supra note 69, at 68; Rosen, supra note 66, at 290–92.
85
Rosen, supra note 66, at 292.
86
Selassie, supra note 69, at 68.
87
See id.; Rosen, supra note 66, at 297.
88
Selassie, supra note 69, at 68.
89
Id.
90
See id. at 69; Rosen, supra note 66, at 297 (taking the domestic figure up to 147,000).
91
See Rosen, supra note 66, at 293.
92
Id. at 298.
93
Selassie, supra note 69, at 69.
84
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In the end, it was nevertheless unclear whether public participation had any real influence on
the actual draft.94 Selassie argues that the main value of the process was in the feeling of public
ownership that it generated over the constitution, and in potentially providing some inspiration
for the drafters95 (although, once again, this value was made irrelevant by the nonimplementation of the constitution). Genuine influence of the public input on the text of the
document was less evident, except in a reduced number of very specific instances such as a
softer stance in the declaration of the state as secular, and a different wording for the oath of
office.96

4. Conclusion
While not as evident as Uganda's case, Eritrea's public participation program appears to have
been of a somewhat top-down nature. This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that public
debates and the gathering of opinions, however extensive, followed instead of preceded the
writing down of proposals for a draft constitution. This may have had part of the responsibility
for the lack of inclusion of substantive changes in the final draft. On the other hand, it can be
argued that Eritrea's situation, with low educational levels, lack of infrastructures, extreme
poverty, and shortly following the nation's war of independence,97 might have warranted a
process focused, at least initially, on constitutional education rather than on participation
properly speaking. In any case, the public participation process seems to have been a good faith
one, with a true interest in learning the opinion of the public and in taking it into account, while
at the same time generating a valuable sense of popular ownership. The non-implementation
of the constitution, however, frustrated the benefits achieved during the drafting process, and
may cast doubts as to the intentions behind the process itself.

D. Zimbabwe (2000 Failed Constitution)

1. Background
Zimbabwe went through the process of drafting a new constitution in the year 2000. A draft
was approved by President Mugabe after his unilateral addition of some important
amendments. In the end, however, due in large part to the excessive presidential involvement
in the process, the draft was rejected in a popular referendum. It is worth noting that a new
constitution was in fact adopted in 2013, after finding massive support in another referendum.
Nevertheless, for the purposes of the present paper I have considered the failed 2000 attempt a
94
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more interesting case study, precisely due to those circumstances that contributed to its ultimate
failure.
The drafting process itself was divided into two parallel, mutually exclusive efforts, official
and unofficial. The Constitutional Commission led the official process, which was
government-driven and completely monopolized by the ruling party (ZANU-PF), the objective
being to ensure presidential control.98 The unofficial process, led by the National Constitutional
Assembly, was an NGO-driven popular movement. Its goal was to boycott the governmental
process, and it placed a greater emphasis on civic education.99 Here I will be focusing on the
Constitutional Commission process, as the only official one, and as the one that in the end had
a real impact on the final draft.

2. The Constitutional Commission's Process: Organization
The Commission was composed of close to 500 commissioners.100 It included nine Thematic
Committees focusing on different constitutional issues. These Thematic Committees were in
turn divided into 100 provincial teams (each having nine members, one per theme), which held
meetings in which submissions were received from the public.101 Substantive organization and
management of the process was undertaken by the Commission's Coordinating Committee.102
The Constitutional Commission's process and its results were entirely subject to presidential
control.103 President Mugabe reserved for himself the power to reject, modify, or stop the
process at any time.104 Furthermore, he put forth a six-month deadline for the completion of
the entire drafting process, something that negatively impacted public participation (among
other things) due to the scarcity of time.105

3. The Commission's Public Participation Process
It was under these restrictive circumstances that the public participation process was set to take
place. The Constitutional Commission nevertheless intended to make the process both
politically and scientifically credible.106 For that purpose, it relied on a number of different
sources to determine the public opinion. These included written submissions; the gathering of
views of constitutional experts through an international conference that brought scholars from
98
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around the world;107 oral submissions before the commissioners by both individuals and
interest groups; and academic publications.108 In general, a List of Constitutional Issues and
Questions guided the process.109
The Coordinating Committee devised two methods of public participation. The first of these
was the "Open Meetings" approach, which included three different forms of participation:
public hearings held by the commissioners in provincial locations, with about 5000 meetings
taking place throughout all of Zimbabwe's fifty-seven districts;110 written submissions sent by
the public to the Constitutional Commission;111 and submissions issued through the
Commission's website.112
The second was the "Scientific method," which focused on statistical results. The statistics
where gathered through a national opinion poll, and through the administration of a
questionnaire to the people around the country.113
In the end, the numbers declared by the Constitutional Commission regarding public
participation where the following: 4,321 public meetings, with 556,276 attendants; 700 special
ad hoc meetings, with 150,000 attendants; 4000 written submissions; and numerous TV and
radio programs, including several in minority languages.114

4. Conclusion
Overall, Zimbabwe's public participation process can be said to have been a commendable and
extensive one, especially taking into account the time limitations. It allowed citizens to openly
debate and discuss the proposed constitution. Once again, however, the draft was proposed to
the public before the people could participate, marking the top-down nature of the process.
Furthermore, the process was in the end defective due to its subjection to the President.115
President Mugabe used his control to unilaterally amend the draft on a number of important
issues, such as the introduction of compulsory military service, the prohibition of same-sex
marriages, and the inclusion of a clause allowing the state to compulsorily acquire agricultural
land for resettlement.116 Even though these obstructive features were not part of the public
participation program itself, they demonstrate how, similar to what happened in Uganda, a few
negative characteristics can make an otherwise legitimate process a nearly worthless one. Here,
the President's overtaking of the process took away any sense of public ownership over the
constitutional draft, which in all likelihood led to the final rejection of the document.
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E. Rwanda (2003 Constitution)

1. Background
In post-genocide Rwanda, the mission of rebuilding the country fell in good part upon the
shoulders of the Legal and Constitutional Commission (LCC). Using other countries as an
example, the LCC prepared a draft constitution, collected thoughts from the public, and
explained to the population the meaning of a constitution and the main ideas that comprise it,
all within a three-year period.117 The resulting public participation process (only one among
the LCC's duties) can be said to have been a widely participatory one, but its elite-driven,
somewhat top-down nature (being heavily influenced by the party in government) has
generated some controversy.
The composition of the LCC consisted of only twelve commissioners, who were elected by the
Transitional National Assembly.118 Of these, eight represented the eight officially registered
parties (mostly limited to parties that were willing allies of the ruling RPF),119 one represented
the army and the national police, two represented the civil society, and one represented the
private sector.120

2. Public Participation
The LCC drafters focused on educating the public about the role of a constitution, and on
identifying widely held beliefs among the population about general governance matters such
as a presidential or a parliamentary system.121 For that purpose, a Constitutional Training
Manual was developed at the beginning of the drafting process for training and sensitizing
Rwandans about the constitution.122
After a period to organize itself, the LCC held a constitution-building seminar, which attracted
broad participation.123 During the seminar, the commissioners developed an Action Plan to be
undertaken in the following sequence124: first, the training and sensitization of the population
regarding the constitution; second, the consultation of the people on the content of the
117
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constitution; third, the writing and validation of the draft text for the constitution; and fourth,
a referendum on the text of the constitution as approved by the Parliament.125
The LCC adopted several specific methods of public participation. One of them was a sixtyquestion questionnaire for the public regarding controversial constitutional issues.126 However,
out of the 50,000 questionnaires distributed, only seven-percent of the responses were
analyzed.127 For those citizens that were illiterate, and therefore could not fill in the
questionnaire, group discussions were facilitated.128
In order to obtain feedback from the public, the LCC also made available free telephone lines,
an email address, and a website.129 In general, feedback and recommendations were
encouraged, with the LCC retaining those ideas and opinions that "prevailed over the rest."130
Another venue through which feedback could be provided were the larger public meetings held
by the members of the LCC.131 The people were also able to submit independent written
comments and proposals.132 A different form of reaching out to the public was through TV and
radio programs.133
It is worth noting, however, that some sensitive topics such as human rights were not open to
public comments and discussion. The drafters of the constitution did not want these questions
to suffer alterations, believing that they were too important to be left to the public opinion.134
Submissions from the population were recorded and awarded a relevance score according to a
scoring system under which expert opinions addressing specific constitutional questions earned
two points; opinions expressed by an interest groups earned three points; and detailed
memorandums submitted by groups earned four points.135 Moreover, the LCC summarized all
answers received from the people in a booklet made publicly available.136
The drafting period ended with a three-day seminar in which 800 people participated, and a
three-month period ensued during which the public could still submit to the LCC further
comments and amendments.137 Once the finalized draft was sent to the Parliament, and that
body made the corresponding amendments, those amendments were also presented to the
people for discussion.138 Finally, a popular referendum adopted the constitution with an
overwhelming support of ninety-three percent of the votes.139
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In total, the LCC commissioners (and thousands of their trained assistants)140 spent six months
participating in local programs and debates, under a budget of about $7 million.141 The public
participation process was a carefully staged one, with a considerable commitment of time and
resources.142 Public consultation was not simply structured following existing party lines, and
the program for popular participation was initiated before an actual constitutional text was
drafted,143 thus providing a better opportunity for the people's views to be included in the
document.
There were, however, important flaws in the Rwandan public participation process, especially
regarding two aspects. The first was the RPF's predominance over the whole process; the
second refers to the elite-driven nature of the LCC, and to its small representativeness.144 Banks
argues that the public was excluded from the internal decision-making process within the LCC,
which did not represent the interests of all Rwandans, mostly due to its small number of
commissioners; the body rarely deliberated substantive issues with the public, and absent a
representative within the LCC, or contacts with the government, citizens lacked the opportunity
to have the drafters seriously engage their ideas or proposals, so that in the end most people
were denied the possibility of substantial participation.145 Moreover, it has been argued that
only RPF members and government sympathizers participated in the forums and debates
convened by the LCC.146 Thus, though the system was one of very significant public
participation, it may have been to some degree one of participation without real power to create
an impact.147 Finally, Banks also argues that the LCC's willingness to engage proposals from
the public depended on the effect that those proposals would have on the distribution of
political power (with only those that did not threaten the status quo being considered).148
Nevertheless, some interest groups, such as gender equality advocates, managed to achieve the
inclusion of the constitutional provisions that they were seeking (in the case of gender equality,
these were the prohibition of gender discrimination, the mandate for equal rights, and the
reservation of thirty percent of the seats in the legislature for women, among others).149

3. Conclusion
Rwanda's is probably the most controversial of all the public participation processes analyzed
so far, in terms of the lack of unanimity regarding its value; the process has both strong
supporters and strong detractors, a disagreement that is evident in the different sources here
cited. All in all, it can be said that it was a widely participative but elite-driven process, which
in some aspects took a paternalistic turn, by taking some matters outside of the realm of public
140
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discussion where it was thought that the people were not prepared to address those issues. On
the other hand, it may be argued in the LCC's defense that the reality of recent war and genocide
warranted the shielding of some especially key and sensitive topics (i.e., human rights). In the
end, however, the overwhelming support for the final draft in the referendum gives weight to
the conclusion that the public participation process succeeded in generating a sense of
ownership over the document, regardless of its somewhat elite-driven, top-down nature.

F. Kenya (2005 Rejected Draft and 2010 Adopted Constitution)

1. Background
Kenya has undergone two recent constitutional drafting processes. The first one, in 2005,
produced a draft that was rejected through a popular referendum. The second one, in 2010,
resulted in an approved constitution. In between the two processes, a period of widespread
violence ensued during the 2008 elections. In this context, it may be adequate to study both
attempts at constitution-making in order to understand their differences. Both of them included
some degree of public participation, so both of them are relevant to our purposes here.

2. The 2005 Process
The first of the recent attempts to enact a new constitution for Kenya took place in 2005. The
drafting process was a participative one, but the proposed constitution was finally rejected in a
popular referendum.150 It thus poses an interesting case study, especially when compared to the
successful 2010 process.
To begin with, the Constitution of Kenya Review Act (the Act) established a three-step
program for the constitutional review process. The first step consisted in public consultation
and an initial drafting by a small review commission;151 thus, consultations preceded the actual
draft. The second step focused on the revision of the draft by a national convention.152 Finally,
the third step was the ratification by Parliament, which did not have the power to amend, but
only to accept or reject.153 The Act, however, emphasized the necessity of consultation with
ordinary Kenyans along the whole constitutional process.154
In order to start off with step one of the process, a Review Commission of twenty-nine members
was created.155 It was empowered to collect and collate the views of the people of Kenya, and
150
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to draft a bill that would alter the existing constitution.156 It was further required to visit every
constituency in the country to collect the citizens' views and to disseminate the draft
constitution among the public.157 At least one public meeting was conducted in every such
constituency.158 Furthermore, the Commission received and analyzed statistically (over a
period of several months) more than 36,000 written submissions, making the results available
to the public.159
For step two, a National Constitutional Conference was established to debate, amend, and adopt
the Review Commission's report and draft, with the revised draft being sent for approval to
Parliament.160 699 delegates composed the Conference; these included representatives from
every district, from every political party, and from religious, professional, and other civil
organizations, thus ensuring public participation (through broad representation) at this second
stage as well.161
An important measure for ensuring the relevance of public participation at every stage of the
process was the Parliament's inability to amend the draft once it was submitted to it, since this
would avoid unilateral modifications contrary to what the people might had expressed.162
There were several problems during the drafting process, however. One was that, while the
National Constitutional Conference did take place in what became known as the Bomas
Conference, it was disrupted after several negotiation stages when various key NGO
representatives decided to pull out of the process, thus affecting its representativeness.163
Another issue was that, even though the Review Act was amended to require a referendum for
approval of the final draft, Parliament was at the same time given the power to introduce
amendments to said draft before submitting it to popular vote, thus perhaps undermining to
some extent the influence of public participation during the first two steps of the process.164 As
a consequence, the final document as amended by Parliament did not end up sufficiently
reflecting the results of the participatory (though disrupted) Bomas draft.165 In the end, this
might have been one of the factors behind the rejection of the document in the popular
referendum.166

3. The 2010 Process
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Not long after the failure of the 2005 attempt at constitutional reform, and following the
outburst of violence during the 2008 elections,167 a new Constitution of Kenya Review Act was
enacted (the 2008 Act).168 According to said Act, the drafting bodies were under the obligation
to ensure that the review process provided the people with an opportunity to actively participate
in both generating and debating the proposals.169
A Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review of nine members was formed (with three
foreigners and six Kenyans),170 the members being nominated by the National Assembly and
appointed by the president.171 Its efforts were mainly aimed at implementing civic education
programs and public participation,172 and it served as the principal technical organ of the
process.173 However, as opposed to the 2005 attempt, public consultation did not play a
prominent role before or during the drafting process. Such consultation took place only after
the draft had been presented to the public, so that people could propose changes to it.174
In general, there were two kinds of participation and outreach programs. The first consisted in
regional public hearings, while the second comprised sectoral and thematic consultations, with
a more specific focus.175 Once the process of public consultation was completed, the initial
draft was accordingly revised and sent to the Parliament.176 Finally, it was submitted to popular
vote through a referendum, and this time it was finally adopted with the assent of the people.177

4. Conclusion
Kenya, especially its 2005 attempt at constitutional review, offers a good example of how a
broad public participation process may not necessarily ensure popular support for, or a sense
of ownership over, a constitutional draft, especially where other political issues may get in the
way, and where subsequent changes to the draft take away part of the value from participation.
It is worth noting that it was the more "bottom-up" draft, in the sense of being the one where
participation preceded the drafting effort, that was finally rejected thorough a referendum. On
the other hand, the 2010 attempt, which to some extent dispensed with pre-draft consultation,
ended up being adopted by the people. This may show how public participation interplays with
other factors in generating the necessary sense of ownership over a constitutional document.

G. Egypt (2012 Constitution)
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1. Background
After the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak from power and the ascension of the Muslim
Brotherhood as the ruling party, Egypt embarked in a process to draft a new, post-revolutionary
constitution. Such process was to some degree participatory in all of its stages: the election of
the Constituent Assembly, the deliberation process, and the programmed referendum for
ratification.178 It has been argued that the actual issues that arose during the drafting process,
and the challenges to its legitimacy, were more the result of lack of agreement among elites
over fundamental issues than a result of lack of participation.179
The issues started from the very beginning, when the original Constituent Assembly became
the ground of a number of conflicts and was dissolved by judicial ruling, making an agreement
to form a new Assembly necessary.180 The new Constituent Assembly was composed of thirtynine members selected from the House of Representatives (dominated by two political parties);
six members selected from the judiciary; nine members selected among law experts; one
member each from the armed forces, the police, and the justice ministry; thirteen members
drawn from the unions; five members selected from the university realm; four members
representing the Coptic Church; and twenty-one members chosen from among public
figures.181 In some sense, to the extent that an important number of Assembly members came
from the elective representative body (the legislature), there was some degree of participation,
if only indirectly, in the composition of the drafting body,182 although there may have been
problems regarding the level of representativeness of the Assembly given the predominance of
Islamists within the seats allotted to the legislature.183
A continuous problem, however, was the hovering threat of dissolution of the Constituent
Assembly by the hands of the military and the courts.184 This threat might have affected the
process to an important extent, by limiting the nature of the proposals that the members of the
Assembly would have been ready to raise or incorporate. In the end, the constitutional question
became moot, even though the constitution itself was adopted, with the military overthrow of
the Muslim Brotherhood government, after massive protests on the part of the opposition and
an apparently insolvable polarization of the Egyptian society.185
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2. Public Participation
It is important to point out from the start that no law required the Constituent Assembly to take
into account the opinions of the citizenry; however, the Assembly was keen to introduce those
opinions before, during, and after the drafting process.186
During the period following the election of the Constituent Assembly, the above-mentioned
deliberation phase, the process was fully participatory.187 The Drafting and Research
Committee of the Assembly (one of the five committees under that body) was tasked with
receiving suggestions and views from the people and from different experts.188 The various
committees toured the country's regions listening to people's views during consultation
meetings, with a total of 160 meetings being held throughout all provinces.189 Furthermore, a
total of 35,000 proposals were received from the public, ranging from one or several
constitutional articles to whole constitutions.190 An innovative initiative was the launch of a
website by the Assembly where the citizens could review the proposed drafts and show support
or disapproval by voting for each article.191 For that purpose, the public could sign in though
their social media accounts (Facebook, Twitter, or email), and give thumbs ups or downs to
specific provisions, or comment on the drafts.192 There were in total an average of 3.4 drafts
per constitutional article,193 thus providing a range of choices for the participating public.
Another innovation was the broadcast of all Constituent Assembly and committee sessions to
the public.194
Once the first constitutional draft was completed, the Assembly launched the "Know Your
Constitution" campaign to encourage community dialogue and to allow citizens to familiarize
themselves with the constitution.195 The campaign included television and radio programs
explaining the content of the document.196 Moreover, special panels were set up within this
same campaign to discuss, among other things, the reasons why some political and civil groups
rejected the draft.197
In addition, public consultation meetings were held in the post-draft phase in order to receive
suggestions on the proposal. These meetings are reported to have received a massive
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attendance.198 At the same time, ninety-five information centers were established nationwide
to address the questions of the population.
For its own part, and parallel to the process of the Constituent Assembly, the Muslim
Brotherhood launched its own campaign to encourage participation in the referendum, and
created its own website to encourage discussion, questions, and suggestions.199 On the other
hand, the opposition also launched awareness campaigns to educate the people about the
process, and to explain why under their view the constitution should be rejected.200 This, on its
part, shows the degree of polarization that surrounded the process.
Indeed, regardless of the broad participation, the process was not free from conflict, and that
conflict ultimately had a profound effect. The Muslim Brotherhood's control over the chairs of
all Assembly committees, through the seats reserved for the House of Representatives, along
with the lack of representation of women, young people, and Coptic Christians,201 led to the
withdrawal of many liberal and non-Muslim Assembly members, and a liberal boycott of the
Constituent Assembly's process ensued, which in turn affected public participation.202 Some
have actually argued that the practical monopolization of the process by the Muslim
Brotherhood made public participation almost worthless, with a final product that did not
reflect the input received from the people.203 Furthermore, even though the constitution was
approved by 63.8 percent of the voters in the final referendum, only 32.9 percent of eligible
voters actually cast their vote, which in turn meant that the constitution received the support of
only a small minority of the total population.204

3. Conclusion
The Egyptian scenario may be particularly interesting in that it is one of the most recent ones,
along with the rest of the "Arab Spring" processes. It thus offers good examples of innovative
methods that differ from other countries' experiences, particularly in the use of more modern
means of public involvement through massive online participation. But Egypt is also a prime
example of how extreme political and ideological polarization, along with lack of complete
representativeness, can negatively affect a public participation process regardless of how widereaching that process may be. So much so, that it has been suggested that the drafting process,
with the polarization that it generated, might have contributed to the final overthrow of Mosri's
Muslim Brotherhood government.205
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Conclusion
The present paper has briefly surveyed public participation in the constitution-making
processes of seven different African countries, in the hope of providing an easy-to-access
document from which those interested may find useful information on public participation in
the continent, and of presenting a comparative overview of the alternative means of
participation. The information, albeit limited, showcases a wide range of those alternatives,
which any contemporary constitutional designer seemingly needs to take into account.
This latter assertion (the seeming necessity of making use of public participation methods),
however, begs the very first question that we should address here: is a public participation
program always necessary for a successful or legitimate constitutional drafting process?206 It
is by all means evident that the information contained in the present paper does not even get
close to providing the level of knowledge necessary for answering that difficult question.207
For one thing, the paper focuses exclusively on countries in which public participation has
actually taken place, leaving aside cases of successful yet non-participatory drafting processes.
And no set of information can be complete where one whole side of the argument (here, stories
of non-participatory constitutions) is missing. I believe, however, that from the case-studies
included herein we can at least draw the easy conclusion that public participation is by no
means enough in itself to secure the success or legitimacy of a constitutional draft, or even to
secure a sense of ownership over it on the part of the people. In this regard, Zimbabwe (2000),
Kenya (2005), and Egypt present examples of the outright failure of a proposed constitution
regardless of a broad public participation. All of these cases show how political instabilities
and encroachments may pose a counterweight to the sentiment of public ownership over the
draft and may end up in the overthrow of that sentiment. And similarly, Eritrea's participation
program, although leading to an approved draft, never saw its contributions implemented in a
working constitution, albeit admittedly due to causes (the government’s lack of commitment
to the document) outside of the drafting process itself. But also processes that have led to the
establishment of a new constitution may see their legitimacy questioned even in the face of an
apparently successful public participation program, as was the case of Uganda.
In any event, if we assume (or determine) the adequacy of a public participation program for a
given constitution-drafting process, it becomes all the more relevant to draw from the past
experience of other nations in order to better understand the possible benefits and drawbacks
of the alternative overall directions and specific measures that may be taken for such a program.
In this sense, the time frame set forth for a drafting process can have a direct effect on its actual
effectiveness, as well as on the effectiveness of the public participation program. This can be
seen from the fact that, while Zimbabwe's failed attempt allowed only six months for its
completion, South Africa's process, commonly regarded as an exemplary one, took close to
two years, with at least sixteen months dedicated to public education and consultation.
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It is of extreme importance, however, to realize that every country presents its own, very unique
circumstances at the time of drafting a new constitutional document. Therefore, the measures
that may have been successful for some may be inadequate for the particular circumstances of
those now affected. Thus, for example, while South Africa's highly successful and outreaching
participation program needed enormous human and logistical resources, the situation in Eritrea
may not have warranted a similar display of means of consultation. Things such as
infrastructure, budget, or previous educational levels of the population may set a limit on what
a nation can realistically expect of a drafting process, including the participatory aspect.
Thus, Eritrea may have been justified in its greater focus on education, such focus being
perhaps an indispensable requirement in nations where the initial educational level is too low
for an informed participation on the part of the people. On the other hand, South Africa and
Rwanda show how educational and consultative processes can be undertaken, if not in a
parallel manner, at least sequentially. In this regard, it is important to differentiate programs
that educate the public about constitutionalism, and programs that educate the public about a
particular constitutional draft. The latter may in fact be associated more with an attempt to
convince than with an attempt to educate properly speaking, at least where no other effort is
made to obtain the views of the people, but even also when those views are to some extent
consulted. That was once again the case in Uganda, with its (ironically) partisan mode of
explaining the advantages of the no-party option. This mode of "education" is more in line with
a top-down process, in which the drafting elites take a leading role in the making of the
constitution, leaving for public consultation questions of a more incidental nature (that is,
questions that may be susceptible to modification even while retaining the core of the original
draft). On the other hand, a bottom-up process (such as South Africa's or, under some
interpretations,208 Egypt's) involves the people from the very beginning, surveying public
opinions on how the constitution should look in the first place, and using those opinions to
create, rather than to modify, an initial draft.
But, as with other features, a bottom-up nature may not always be more desirable than a topdown one, at least when the top-down option involves a good faith effort to take the public's
views into account in order to make the necessary modifications to the original document. For
one thing, Kenya illustrates how a top-down process can succeed where a bottom-up one has
failed. Even though the reasons for the respective failure and success of the 2005 and 2010
processes do in all likelihood not rest simply on the nature of the public participation program,
the change in approach might have played a role. Indeed, a more top-down process may provide
a higher degree of organization and a focus on the kind of issues that the average citizen will
be interested in (especially, once again, in developing countries with a lower educational level).
Thus, even though South Africa's process was in all respects a bottom-up one, most of the
submissions made by the public dealt, not with fundamental constitutional issues, but with dayto-day problems that the people wished to see addressed in the constitution.209 On the other
hand, even the people's day-to-day problems may be relevant in terms of the fundamental
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aspects of a constitution, which after all should be drafted in a way so as to improve the lives
of the citizens of the nation. Thus, massive lack of access to resources may warrant a greater
emphasis on socioeconomic rights, something that may be harder to incorporate where there is
an already-circulating draft. Similarly, where whole segments of the population complain about
their inability to have their voices heard by the decision-makers, a fundamental alteration of
the system of representation may be necessary.
Perhaps more problematic are cases of outright paternalism on the part of the drafting elites, as
was the case of Rwanda, where an aspect so fundamental to a constitution as the incorporation
of human rights was purposefully left out of the public debate;210 and to a lesser extent the case
of Eritrea. The obvious rationale behind the exclusion in the case of Rwanda was the
consideration of human rights as essential in the post-genocide context, something which in
turn made proposals of alternatives to their inclusion undesirable. While thus shielding some
aspects considered essential from the possibility of alteration, this paternalism presents issues
in terms of its potential for generating a product that may not reflect the views of the people.
This, in turn, could (speculatively) contribute to a popular notion of human rights as a foreign
element, and to a reduced sense of public ownership over the constitution, with the consequent
decrease in the internalization of the document. Furthermore, public discussion may not
necessarily lean towards a rejection of human rights, but rather, and much more likely, towards
the consideration of cultural and other concerns in the assimilation of those rights (which may
conversely have been precisely what the drafters sought to avoid). On the other hand, delicate
issues such as human rights may in fact produce a certain degree of polarization among the
population, and a consequent destabilization of a post-conflict society, which will arguably be
itself in a delicate situation. Therefore, as with most other aspects of public participation, it is
highly advisable to acknowledge the peculiarities of the society being addressed, and to reject
as much as possible categorical presumptions, in order to determine the best possible
alternative for a particular constitutional process. Let it be said at least that, in the case of
Rwanda, the denial of consultation on human rights matters does not seem to have led to
undesirable consequences beyond the lack of consultation itself, and that even regarding the
matter of rights there were some relevant contributions on the part of the public, as the later
inclusion of women's rights clauses showed.211
From all the above the conclusion may be drawn that some circumstantial factors do warrant
the choice in favor of a more top-down, or even paternalistic, approach to participation. In this
regard, we should differentiate the more “legitimate” (assuming that meaningful participation
is an element of legitimacy) top-down processes, in which elites only take the initiative at first
but leave a substantial ground for public participation, and are willing to implement the
modifications pertinent to that participation, from the less "legitimate" ones, in which public
participation is used only as a legitimizing or face-saving tool, with no intentions of actually
taking the people's views into account; or, at best, as a tool to educate and convince the people
about a particular draft. Eritrea's, Rwanda's, and Kenya's (2010) processes seem to fall under
the former (“legitimate”) category, whereas Uganda's probably stands at the borderline of the
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latter. It is important to note, in any case, that even these rather top-down participatory
processes are significantly less so (top-down) that the ultimate top-down drafting efforts; that
is, those that do not include any sort of public participation. Among the factors that could
warrant the choice of a (legitimate) top-down participatory process may be, as we have seen,
low levels of education, unavailability of infrastructures or resources, and post-conflict
instability and the need to shield some constitutional clauses from debate and alteration
(leading to potential conflict). It must be pointed out, however, that even under these
circumstances there seems to be little harm in obtaining the views of the public in an a priori
fashion (that is, before the drafting of an initial constitutional proposal), thus greatly enhancing
the legitimacy of the process in the eyes of those taking part in it (so long as the a priori
consultation remains a good faith one).
Overall, the trend in the African nations surveyed seems to show a preference for a somewhat
more top-down approach, in varying degrees. There are some exceptions, namely South Africa,
Kenya (in its original 2005 plan), and (arguably) Egypt. Of the rather top-down processes,
Uganda's and Zimbabwe's (2000) were perhaps the most problematic, being as they were under
the absolute control of the ruling party and of the president respectively. Education is for the
most part preferred over consultation, at least during the initial stages, which may make sense
in the context of developing nations with little popular knowledge of legal and constitutional
concepts. It is worth noticing that out of the processes analyzed, only South Africa's, Uganda's,
Rwanda's, and Kenya's (2010) led to established constitutions, whereas the Eritrean,
Zimbabwean (2000), Kenyan (2005), and Egyptian constitutions ultimately failed at one stage
or another. The diversity among both the failed and the successful processes shows the impact
that external circumstances can have on the effectiveness of a public participation program,
and the enormous variety of methods that can be followed to conduct such programs.
Furthermore, not all the participation processes carried the same weight in their respective
constitutional draft, with Eritrea, Uganda, and Zimbabwe scoring perhaps the lowest in this
regard.
All-in-all, what can be concluded from these country studies is that for public participation to
remain meaningful, the situation of a nation must be stable enough, politically and otherwise,
so as to afford the people an opportunity to express their views, and to have those views taken
into account. But even more importantly, there must be a good faith desire, genuinely supported
by adequate resources, to educate and consult the public, so that they may have an informed
and substantive say in the drafting of a constitution that is after all meant to guide the future of
their nation. Only then could such constitution be deemed to truly represent the voice of the
people.

